An important but largely neglected question in the literature on private equity investing is how the competitive environment shapes the behavior of private equity firms. In this study, we first explore whether competition has an impact on the role of previous industry knowledge for the generation of investment opportunities. Second, we study the impact of competition on the valuation of investment targets. Our hypotheses are tested on a unique hand-collected dataset of the UK buyout market. Using different measures of competition, our results show that increased competition has two opposing effects on the role of previous industry knowledge for the selection of investment opportunities. Further, increased competition leads to higher valuations of target firms.
INTRODUCTION
The private equity market has grown dramatically over the last 20 years both in the US and Europe (Bottazzi et al., 2002; Gompers et al., 2001) . The private equity market is an important source of funds for start-up firms, private middle market firms, firms in financial distress and public firms seeking buy-out financing. An important characteristic of the private equity market is the periodic changes in supply and demand conditions (Gompers et al., 2000; Inderst et al., 2004) . Until recently, few studies have looked at the interplay of competitive forces in the private equity market and their implications for private equity firms.
The goal of this paper is to explore whether competition has an impact on the selection and valuation of investment targets by private equity investors. First, we examine how competition affects the role of previous industry knowledge for the selection of investment opportunities. Second, we study the impact of competition on the valuation of private equity backed companies. Unlike previous studies that look at the effect of competition on the valuation of new ventures (Gompers et al., 2000; Ljungqvist et al., 2003) , we also look at the effect of industry concentration on the valuation of investment targets. This is a largely unexplored area to date. We test our hypotheses by studying the investment behaviour of private equity firms active in the market for management buyouts in the UK during the period 1993 till 2002. We construct a unique dataset involving data from: (1) the state of the overall private equity market, (2) the private equity firms active in this market and (3) the deals that these private equity firms are involved in. We employ logistic regression and OLS regression to test our hypotheses.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. First, we present our theoretical framework and related hypotheses. The following section outlines the data and methods used in the analyses. Next, we present the results from the empirical analyses. Finally, we discuss our findings, conclude and outline potential avenues for future research.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES
The private equity market is highly cyclical, with periodic changes in supply and demand conditions (Gompers et al., 1998) . The impact of the competitive environment on the different activities private equity firms perform, however, has only received scant attention in the literature. Inderst and Müller (2004 ) develop a theoretical model in which they look at the effect of demand and supply conditions in the venture capital market on the screening, deal structuring, value adding and harvesting of venture capital deals. Some of their predictions have yielded empirical support. For example, Bengtsson et al. (2002) have shown how deal flow competition reduces the extent of screening by venture capital firms. Further, Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003) show how private equity firms" search time for good deals increases when competition intensifies. With respect to valuation, Gompers and Lerner (2000) show how capital market competition drives the pre-money valuation of venture capital backed start-ups. Kaplan and Stein (1993) also document that too much capital inflow in the leveraged buyout market during the end of the eighties led to overheating. In terms of exit decisions by private equity firms, tough competition at the time of the investment leads to longer holding periods (Ljungqvist et al., 2003) and lower performance (Kaplan et al., 2005) . Lastly, Meuleman et al. (2006) show how increased competition reduces the role of previous partner experience in the selection of partners in private equity syndicates. In the remainder of this paper, we develop hypotheses with respect to the impact of competition in the private equity market on the selection and valuation by private equity firms.
Competition and the Selection of Investment Opportunities
At the start of the private equity cycle, it is crucial for private equity firms to obtain access to viable projects which can be funded at entry prices which will generate target rates of return. Most private equity firms will focus their search efforts on a number of industries for which they have previous industry knowledge (Sorenson et al., 2001 ). There are two main reasons for this localized search. First of all, the preinvestment activities of private equity firms involve acquiring and evaluating information about the existence and characteristics of investment opportunities. These tasks are facilitated when firms have previous industry experience and when firms can rely on an extensive network of contacts in a particular industry. Second, after the investment has been made, private equity investors play a prominent role in monitoring their portfolio companies both for early stage investments (Kaplan et al., 2004) and later stage buyout investments (Cotter et al., 2001) . Again, previous industry knowledge facilitates the postinvestment role of the private equity investor. For example, previous industry experience enhances the private equity firm"s ability to assess industry dynamics.
The overall effect of competition on the role of previous industry knowledge for the generation of investment opportunities is unclear. There are some reasons why increased competition in the private equity market might induce firms to broaden their investment scope. First of all, Inderst and Müller"s (2004) theoretical model predicts that increased competition in the private equity market increases the search time private equity firms need to identify viable investment opportunities. One potential solution to this problem is widening the scope of one"s search effort to new industries in order to assure sufficient deal flow. Second, slack resources might facilitate search and experimentation (Sidhu et al., 2004) . When too much funds are flowing into the industry, firms might be inclined to take on higher risk by exploring new areas for investment opportunities. We expect, therefore, that increased competition in the private equity market will decrease the role of previous industry knowledge for the selection of investment opportunities. Hence:
H1a: Higher levels of competition will decrease the role of previous industry knowledge for the selection of investment opportunities.
There are also reasons, however, why higher levels of competition will increase the role of previous industry knowledge for the selection of investment opportunities. Due to rising competition in the market for private equity, it becomes more and more difficult for private equity investors to appropriate potential value creation in private equity transaction as more and more players are capable of realizing value. As a result, common sources of value creation are likely to be bid away in the process of competition (De Maeseneire et al., 2004) . In order to appropriate part of the value creation, a private equity investor requires unique resources and capabilities that can be levered onto the acquisition (Barney, 1991) . The key implication of heterogeneity in resources is that private equity investors are likely to pursue those acquisitions in which their distinctive resources create the highest potential value. As such, private equity investors who are specialized in specific industries will combine a superior resource base with industry specific ties that allow for unique value creation (Arthurs et al., 2006; Wright et al., 2000) . Several authors have pointed to the increasing pressure for industry specialization in the private equity market in order to cope with increased levels of competition (e.g. De Maeseneire et al., 2004) . Therefore, we expect that increased competition will increase the role of previous industry knowledge for the selection of investment opportunities. Hence:
H1b: Higher levels of competition will increase the role of previous industry knowledge for the selection of investment opportunities.
Competition and Deal Valuation
An important question in the financial literature is whether the valuation of firms is affected by exogenous shifts in the demand for securities. Finance theory predicts that the value of a firm should be equal to the discounted cash flow of its expected future cash flows. Therefore, the movement in prices should be driven by changes in the growth prospects of the future cash flows or changes in the riskiness of these cash flows. This implies that demand curves for financial securities should be flat. Some studies have found support that demand curves for stocks slope downwards (e.g. Shleifer, 1986) . Most of these studies, however, focus on the valuation of public securities. Only a few studies have looked at the effect of demand shifts on asset prices in the private market. Both Gompers and Lerner (2000) and Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003) provide evidence that increased inflows of funds in the private equity market led to higher valuations of investment targets. None of these studies, however, has looked at the impact of industry concentration on the valuation of firms. Our figures for the UK suggest that industry concentration in the private equity market has fluctuated considerably during the nineties. An important question is how this has impacted the valuations of firms at the time of the investment. We expect that increased competition will result in higher price at the time of the investment. Hence:
H2: Higher levels of competition will increase the prices paid at the time of investment.
DATA AND METHODS

Data
The data for our analyses are obtained from two major sources. First, buyout deals are identified through a hand collected database maintained by the Centre for Management Buyout Research (CMBOR). This database covers the entire population of buyouts in the UK from the beginning of the 1980s onwards. We used different criteria to select our sample. First, we excluded public-to-private buyouts as these transactions are typically very different from the private buyout transactions. Second, we only selected private-equity backed buyout transactions as the behavior of private equity firms is the main focus of this paper. Lastly, in order to exclude investments from occasional investors, we only included investment by private equity players who have more than 5 transactions over the observation period.
1 The total sample then consists of 1532 private equity backed buyout transactions that occurred between 1993 and 2002 in the UK.
Second, as CMBOR only collects transaction specific data, complementary data on the characteristics of the private equity investors involved in these transactions and on the state of the overall private equity market was gathered through directories and yearbooks issued by the British Venture Capital Association (BVCA) and the European Venture Capital Association (EVCA).
Empirical Strategy
We run two sets of analyses to test our hypotheses. First of all, in order to study the impact of competition on the role of previous industry knowledge for the selection of investment opportunities, we use a similar approach to Sorenson and Stuart (2001) who study investment patterns of US venture capitalists. We model the probability that a particular private equity firm i invests in a given buyout company j. Thus, the presence or absence of the ijth link determines the realization of the outcome variable. We use a matched sample design to generate our data. The unit of analysis is the buy-out investment. In total, our data include 1532 realized buyout investments by private equity firms. For each of these investments, we create a matched sample of investments a private equity firm could potentially have invested in but did not. Therefore, the dependent variable in our analyses is binary and equals 1 if particular buyout target was chosen as investment by a private equity firm and 0 for the matched sample of investments it could have invested in but did not. We create a matched sample on a 1:5 ratio. We use two criteria to choose our matched sample. First of all, the buyout investments should have occurred in the same year as the year the private equity investor invested in a particular buyout target. Second, in order to control for the size of the deal, we only selected buyout investments that lie in a 25% value range of the buyout investment that was funded by the private equity firm. In total, then, our sample includes 9212 observations -1532 cases and 7660 controls. As our dependent variable is binary, we use logistic regression to estimate our model. The general model takes the following form of equation 1:
Hypotheses 1a and 1b are tested by adding interaction terms to model 1. The interaction terms enable us to investigate the conditions under which previous industry knowledge will be more or less important for the selection of investments opportunities. The continuous variables used as components of an interaction term are centered to reduce multicollinearity (Cohen et al., 2003) . The model estimated is presented in equation 2:
Selection buyout target = f(industry knowledge, industry knowledge*competition, control variables)
As logistic regression can yield biased estimates when the proportion of positive outcomes in the sample does not match the proportion of positive outcomes in the population, we correct for this potential bias by using the method proposed by King and Zeng (2001) for the logistic regression of rare events.
In order to study the impact of competition on the valuation of buyout targets by private equity firms, we use two different approaches. First, similar to Gompers and Lerner (2000) , we employ a hedonic regression approach. The transaction value is the dependent variable, and the characteristics of the firm and the environment are the independent variables. The transaction value is the total enterprise value. An important assumption of hedonic pricing models is that most of the factors that are important for determining the price of the firm are included in the model as omitted variables may introduce biases that lead to mistaken interpretations of the results. We employ an ordinary least square specification using a log-log framework to estimate our model. In the "log-log" framework, the logarithm of the valuation is regressed on the dummy variables and the logarithms of the continuous, non-negative variables. The loglog specification assumes a more reasonable multiplicative error structure. The model estimated is presented in equation 3:
Log transaction value = f(log competition, control variables)
One problem with the previous approach is that it regresses measures of size on size and hence rsquares might be artificially high (Kaplan et al., 1995) . Therefore, we also use a relative price measure as dependent variable namely the price earnings ratio using the earnings in the year before the transaction.
We exclude observations with negative earnings because the price earnings multiple is meaningless in that case. Additionally, we dropped those observations that fall in the smallest 1% quantile or largest 1% quantile of the price earnings distribution as some of these figures are unrealistically high or low. Again, we use an ordinary least square specification using a "log-log" framework to estimate this model. Equation 4 presents the estimated model:
Log (transaction value/earnings) = f(log competition, control variables)
Independent Variables
The independent variables of interest measure previous industry knowledge and the extent of competition. Control variables are added.
Industry knowledge. Industry knowledge is measured by the number of previous buyout investments a private equity firm has in the industry of the buyout target in the five years preceding the year of the buyout. We distinguish between 35 different industries. Private equity companies with previous industry experience will be better in performing due diligence and monitoring and therefore they are likely to be more efficient and successful in these activities (Sorenson & Stuart, 2001 ). The higher this figure, the more likely a firm will invest in a buyout target. We take the logarithm of this number.
Intensity of competition.
We use different measures to capture the intensity of competition. First, we use the traditional CR4 and Herfindahl-Hirschman (HH) concentration ratios. In order to calculate our concentration ratios, we segment the market according to the value range of the transactions (HH value range, CR4 value range). Most private equity companies have a minimum and maximum investment amount they are able to invest and, therefore, the market is fragmented. We distinguish between 4 different segments in the private equity market: transactions with a total deal value between £0-10 million, £10-25 million, £25-100 million and transactions with a value higher than £100 million. For each of these segments, we calculate concentration ratios. Market shares are based on the number of transactions each private equity firm is involved in.
Second, similar to Gompers and Lerner (2000) , we measure overall industry competition by the total funds raised for buyout investment in the year preceding the buyout transaction (log funds raised buyouts). The EVCA yearbook only has detailed information on the total funds raised in the UK for buyout transaction from 1998 onwards. For the period 1993 to 1997, we estimated the funds that will be allocated to buyout investments by multiplying the total private equity funds raised by the percentage that was actually invested in buyouts in the years the funds were raised. These figures were inflation adjusted to control for nominal price increases. We take the logarithm of this measure.
Third, we measure the potential competition for a specific deal (# investors with industry experience buyout target). The intensity of competition for a particular deal is proxied by counting the number of investors active in the year of the buyout that have industry experience with respect to the buyout target. Firms with previous experience in a particular industry are more likely to be aware of potential deals and will also be more inclined to invest (Sorenson et al., 2001 ). The number of competitors is an important determinant of the level of competition in an industry (Porter, 1980) . We distinguish between 35 different industries. A higher value indicates a higher potential level of competition for a specific deal.
Control variables. In the analyses with respect to the selection of buyout investments, we include different control variables. We only need to control for private equity firm characteristics to the extent that they interact with the buyout target characteristics. All other private equity firm characteristics are common to the selected buyout investment and the matched sample and thus cancel out in the logit specification. First, we control whether a firm is active in a specific geographical area of the UK (geographical presence). Geographical presence is measured by a dummy variable that indicates whether an investor has previously invested in buyouts in the region of the buyout target. A distinction is made between 12 different regions in the UK. The coefficient of this variable is expected to be positive. Second, we control for the number of receiverships a private equity firm has in the industry of the buyout target in the year preceding the transaction (# of receiverships industry target). We expect private equity firms to be less likely to invest in industries in which they had negative experiences in the recent past. Further, we include the main terms of our interaction variables to control for their main effect. Lastly, we control for heterogeneity in the supply of private equity across different industries (Sorenson et al., 2001 ). To account for supply conditions, we sum the number of buyout investments in the target industry as a percentage of the total number of private equity investments in the year prior to the investment (% of private equity in industry buyout target).
We also include different control variables in the regressions that analyze the valuation of buyout targets. First, in order to control for the size of the company, regressions include the logarithm of the firm"s employment (log employees) and sales (log sales). Further, we include a dummy indicating whether the firm was profitable (profit dummy). Profitable firms are likely to receive higher valuations. We also include the total amount of debt as a percentage of the total financing used to acquire the buyout target (leverage). The availability of debt financing might have an impact on the price private equity firms can pay to acquire a buyout target. Additionally, we include different dummies indicating the type and source of the buyout transaction. We distinguish between four different types of buyouts: buyouts (buyout dummy), buy-ins (buy-in dummy), a combination of a buyout and a buy-in (bimbo dummy) and investor led buyouts (ibo dummy). With respect to the source of the buyout transaction, we include dummies for buyouts following a receivership (receivership dummy), buyouts resulting from a divestment (divestment dummy) and secondary buyouts (secondary buyout dummy). Lastly, in order to control for unobserved heterogeneity such as stock market conditions, we include two-yearly time dummies and industry dummies.
Descriptives
The sample used in the analyses consists of 1532 private equity backed buyout transactions in which 80 private equity firms participated. The standard deviations indicate that there is substantial variation among the private equity firms and their investments. Table 1 provides summary statistics for some of our competition variables. In general, concentration ratios are smaller for the upper end of the market.
The correlation statistics shows that the HH concentration index is highly correlated with the CR4 concentration index. Therefore, we do not include them in the same regression. We use the HH concentration index as this is the most fine-grained measure. 2 The correlations between all the other variables used in the regression analyses are below 0.70 and, therefore, should not pose multicollinearity problems. Table 2 presents logistic estimates for the effects of factors influencing the selection of investment opportunities by private equity firms. The dependent variable takes a value of 1 when a private equity firm invests in a particular buyout target and 0 for the matched cases it did not invest in. As we use rare event logistical regression with robust standard errors, likelihood ratio"s and r-squares are not reported by the statistical package employed (Stata). A Wald test, however, indicates that all our models are statistically significant.
RESULTS
Model 1 is a baseline model which includes all the control variables. The independent variables of interest are added in the other models. The coefficient of previous industry knowledge is highly significant and positive as expected. Firms are more likely to invest in buyout targets for which they have previous industry knowledge. Further, regional presence also has a positive coefficient and is highly significant in all of our models. Firms are more likely to invest in regions in which they were previously active. When private equity firms experienced receiverships in the industry of the buyout target, they are significantly less likely to invest. The other control variables included in our model are not significant.
Hypothesis 1 is tested in models 2 to 5 by including different interaction terms. Except for model 3, Wald tests indicate that adding the interaction terms improves the fit of the models significantly. Model 2 introduces the interaction term between industry knowledge and the HH concentration index for the value range of the transaction. The coefficient has the expected sign and is highly significant. The higher the concentration, the more likely firms will select investment opportunities for which they have previous industry knowledge. Model 3 includes the interaction between industry knowledge and the total funds raised for buyouts in the year preceding the buyout investment. The sign of this interaction term is negative, as expected, and marginal significant. The role of industry knowledge for the selection of investment opportunities seems to decrease when more funds are flowing into the industry. In model 4, we introduce the interaction between industry knowledge and the number of other investors who have industry experience with respect to the industry of the buyout target. Surprisingly, the coefficient of this variable is positive and significant. The more investors who have industry experience with respect to a particular buyout target, the more important is industry knowledge. Lastly, in model 5 we introduce all the interaction terms to test the robustness of our results. This model shows that all the results remain unchanged. Overall, these results provide mixed support for hypothesis 1a.
In Table 3 , we present OLS estimates for the effect of competition on the valuation of deals using a log-log specification. In model 1 and 2, the dependent variable equals the log of the transaction value. Both models are highly significant and have large r-squares. Model 1 shows that larger firms are associated with higher valuations as expected. Further, profitable firms receive significantly higher valuations. Highly levered transactions have significantly higher valuations. Additionally, investor led buyouts are associated with higher valuations and buyouts following a receivership receive significantly lower valuations. In model 2, we introduce the effect our different competition variables. The coefficient of the HH concentration index is highly significant and has the expected sign. Higher concentration values are associated with lower valuations. The other variables measuring competition are not significant.
In model 3 and 4, the dependent variable is the log of the price earnings multiple. The number of observations drops to 927 as we loose firms with a negative price earnings and firms for which the earnings were missing. Both models are highly significant. The r-square is substantially lower as compared to the previous model. Model 3 shows that larger firms as measured by the number of employees are associated with higher price earnings. Further, buyout following a receivership receive lower valuations. The other variables that were significant in model 1 are not significant anymore. In model 4, we introduce the effect of our competition variables. The coefficient of the HH concentration ratio is still negative as expected though it is only marginal significant. The coefficient of the total funds raised for buyout transactions in the year preceding the buyout has a positive and highly significant effect on the price earnings multiple paid in buyout transactions. The effect of the number of investors with industry experience with respect to the buyout target is not significant. Overall, these results provide support for hypothesis 2.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this study, we sought to extend previous research on the impact of the competitive environment on the different activities private equity investors are involved in. First, we examined the impact of competition on the role of previous industry knowledge for the selection of investment opportunities. Our hypotheses receive mixed support. When competition is measured at the level of the overall private equity industry, our results indicate that higher levels of competition reduces the role of previous industry knowledge for the selection of investment opportunities. Private equity firms are less likely to rely on existing areas of expertise for the generation of investment opportunities. These results imply that competition forces private equity players to search for new industries in order to invest their funds. When competition is measured at the level of the specific industry in which the buyout target operates, our results indicate that previous industry knowledge becomes more important for the selection of investment opportunities. The more investors who have experience with respect to the industry of the buyout company, the more important will be the role of previous industry experience in order to win a particular deal. Second, in line with previous studies (Gompers et al., 2000; Ljungqvist et al., 2003) , our results show that a higher level of competition, measured by the overall inflow of funds and the industry concentration, leads to higher valuation of investment targets in the private market. To the authors" knowledge, this study is the first to examine the impact of industry concentration on the valuation of companies in the private market.
This study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First of all, previous studies on the selection of private equity investments have mainly focused on characteristics of the investment target such as the management team (MacMillan et al., 1985) . These studies, however, have largely ignored the impact of the external environment on the way how private equity firms select their investments. Our study adds to a recent literature that shows how market competition has an impact on the deal generation and screening efforts of private equity firms (Bengtsson et al., 2002; Inderst et al., 2004) . Our results indicate two opposing effects of competition on the role of previous industry knowledge for the selection of investment opportunities. On the one hand, our analyses indicate that previous industry knowledge becomes less important for the selection of investment opportunities for higher levels of competition in the overall market for private equity firms. The main reason we offer for this finding is that private equity firms need to explore new areas for investment outside their existing specialization in order to assure sufficient deal flow. These results imply that competition increases the availability of funding in previously under explored industries.
On the other hand, in line with previous studies that have emphasized the role of investor capabilities for generating and appropriating value in private equity backed companies (Bygrave, 1987; De Maeseneire et al., 2004) , our results show that the role of previous industry knowledge increases as more investors gain experience in a particular industry. This finding clearly corresponds to statements in the more popular business press. For example, the European Venture Capital Journal (2004) reports: "Institutional investors, and indeed portfolio management teams, expect buyout sponsors to have an active post-deal strategy for growth and to differentiate themselves clearly from competitors." From a more theoretical point of view, these insights illustrate how the value of a resource -for example detailed industry knowledge -depends on the overall competitive environment. These results provide some insights in the interplay between the resource-based perspective (Barney, 1991) and the competitive strategy perspective (Porter, 1980) . As such, this study adds to the literature that looks both at industry and firm specific factors in order to explain sustainable competitive advantage (e.g. Spanos et al., 2001) .
Second, previous studies that have looked at the impact of competition on the valuation of companies in the private market have ignored the effect of industry concentration (e.g. Gompers et al., 2000) . Our study contributes to this literature by showing that industry concentration has an impact on the valuation of target companies. In line with studies that look at the effect of industry concentration in banking, our study indicates that increased market power enables private equity firm to negotiate lower prices. Further, we also find that flows of capital in the private equity market affect the valuation of buyout targets. These results are important from a theoretical point of view as they provide an example of a situation in which demand curves for securities slope downward. These findings have important implications as they might indicate that inflow of funds could have a destabilizing effect on the overall industry. For example, in today"s private equity environment, several observers have expressed a concern of potential overheating because of too much funds chasing to few deals. This study has limitations that suggest a number of avenues for extending and enhancing future research. First, when we look at the role of previous industry knowledge for the selection of private equity investments, we are not able to capture industry knowledge private equity firms might gain through their extensive network of interpersonal and interfirm relationships. Private equity firms, for example, might attract new partners with specific skills before entering new industries. This raises an important question about the dynamic capabilities of private equity firms to renew their existing resource base in order to cope with today"s competitive environment. Second, when we study the impact of fund inflows on the valuation of private equity targets, it is unclear whether increased prices better reflect the underlying value of the asset as some firms previously benefited from market power or whether firms are paying too much as a result of competition. Future research could look more deeply into this. Lastly, in our empirical setting we have focused on the later stage buyout market which differs from the early stage venture capital market. For example, venture capital firms tend to be more specialized as compared to buyout investors. Future research could examine whether some of our results also apply to the early stage venture capital market. 
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